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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the demand for debt-based financing instruments of the Islamic banks. 
Debt-based financing, such as through bai bithaman ajil and al-murabahah, is by far the most prominent of the Islamic 
bank financing system and yet it has been largely ignored in Islamic economics literature. Most studies instead have been 
focusing on equity-based financing of al-mudarabah and al-musyarakah. Islamic banks offer debt-based financing through 
various instruments derived under the principle of exchange or more specifically, the deferred contract of exchange. In 
this paper we set an analytical framework that is based on an infinitely lived representative agent model to analyze the 
demand for goods to be purchased by deferred payments. The resulting demand will then be used to derive the demand 
for Islamic debt. We also investigate theoretically, factors that may have an impact on the demand for Islamic debt.
Keywords: Debt-based financing; Islamic debt; deferred contract of exchange; inter-temporal utility maximizing model; 
Islamic banking
ABSTRAK
Makalah ini secara teori menganalisis permintaan untuk instrumen pembiayaan berasas hutang yang ditawarkan oleh 
perbankan Islam. Pembiayaan berasaskan hutang misalnya, bai bithaman ajil dan al-murabahah adalah komponen 
terpenting pembiayaan perbankan Islam, namun sering diabaikan dalam pustaka ekonomi Islam. Sebaliknya, kebanyakan 
kajian bidang ini lebih tertumpu kepada pembiayaan berasaskan ekuiti menerusi al-mudarabah dan al-musharakah. 
Perbankan Islam menawarkan pembiayaan berasas hutang melalui pelbagai instrumen yang dicipta menggunakan 
prinsip kontrak pertukaran, atau lebih khusus, kontrak jualbeli tangguh. Dalam makalah ini dipaparkan satu kerangka 
analisis berasaskan model agen perwakilan berkehidupan infinit untuk menganalisis permintaan untuk pembelian 
barang secara tangguh. Seterusnya, permintaan yang terhasil digunakan untuk menerbitkan permintaan untuk hutang 
perbankan Islam. Kajian ini juga secara teori menyelidik faktor-faktor yang boleh memberi kesan terhadap permintaan 
hutang perbankan Islam.
Kata kunci: Pembiayaan berasas hutang; hutang perbankan Islam; kontrak jualbeli tangguh; model agen perwakilan 
berkehidupan infiniti; perbankan Islam
INTRODUCTION
A major source of contradiction in Islamic finance theory 
is the treatment of debt financing. The vast majority of 
studies in this area have been ignoring debt-based finance 
and practically all analytical-models of Islamic banking 
are derived under the principle of profit and loss sharing. 
This is in sharp contrast to the practical world of Islamic 
banking in which debt-based finance dominates equity-
based finance by a large margin.
Islamic banking refers to a system of banking that 
complies with Islamic law, the Shari’ah. The most 
important Shari’ah principle that governs Islamic banking 
is the prohibition of riba. Interest is a form of riba and 
thus, Islamic banks are not allowed to utilize interest-based 
contracts in order to affect debt financing. Prohibition of 
interest however, does not mean that the Shari’ah also 
prohibits debt financing. On the contrary, Islamic banking 
is allowed to utilize debt as well as being allowed to use 
equity as a mode of finance. However, unlike conventional 
banking which uses loan-based contracts, Islamic banking 
utilizes the deferred contract of exchange for affecting debt 
financing. This contract of exchange is legitimate in the 
view of practically all the major schools of jurisprudence 
or mazhabs (Abdul Halim 2005; Joni Tamkin 2005) and 
is today the most widely used mechanism for financing 
in Islamic banking. According to Al Qaradawi (1960) it 
is permissible to sell an article for deferred payments. He 
relates his opinion to al Hadith narrated by Al Bukhary 
that “The Prophet (pbuh) bought some grain from a Jew, 
to be paid for at a specific time, pledging his coat of mail 
as security.” Al Qaradawi (1960) additionally points out 
that the majority of scholars, and those from the Shafi’i 
and Hanafi schools, are of the opinion that it is legitimate 
for the seller to ask for a higher price if the buyer asks for 
deferred payments.
Despite its legitimacy, the majority of academic 
researchers always view Islamic debt financing in a 
negative light. Many have criticized this type of financing 
on the ground that it does not strictly conform to Islamic 
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teaching (Chapra 1986; Metwally 1997; Siddiqi 1998), 
being less Islamic and thus, there should be minimal use 
of this type of financing (Zakaria 1987) as it is just a 
disguise to legalize riba (Chapra 1986; Metwally 1994). 
Khan (1986) condemned Islamic debt financing on the 
ground that it carries a fixed or predetermined return for 
the use of money, whilst others (Chapra 1986; Siddiqi 
1985) believe that it helps in promoting social justice, 
economic efficiency and stability. For many researchers 
in Islamic economics, the equity-based finance is the 
preferred mode of financing of the Islamic banking 
system and that the principle of profit and loss sharing 
(PLS) should form a basis for modeling Islamic banking 
and finance. Consequently, many analytical studies 
on Islamic banking and finance have utilized the PLS 
principle of mudharabah, either as the reference point or 
as a basis for their theoretical framework (Chong & Liu 
2009; Cihak & Hesse 2008; Metwally 1997). Moreover, 
theoretical-models of Islamic banking and the Islamic 
economy that have been developed (Choudhury 2000; 
Hassan & Choudhury 2002; Hasan 2002; Khan 1986) are 
all derived from utilizing the PLS principal.
It is no doubt that PLS-based models help facilitate 
understanding of the workings of Islamic banking and 
contribute significantly to Islamic finance. However, the 
facts that al-mudarabah and al-musharakah financing 
through the PLS principle are the most sparingly used 
tools of financing in Islamic banking and are on a 
declining trend (Hasan 2002; Mansor et al. 2010) 
provide an indication that PLS-based models are not the 
true reflection of the actual Islamic banking and finance 
system. Indeed, a model of debt financing should be a 
better representative.
This study is an attempt to set up an analytical 
framework that is consistent with debt financing of the 
Islamic banking system. A modest aim of this paper is 
to present a theoretical analysis of the demand for debt 
financing instruments of the Islamic banking system. For 
this purpose, a standard infinitely lived representative 
agent model (ILRA model) is modified to cater for the 
existence of goods transacted under the deferred contract 
of exchange. Finally, the paper analyzes the determinants 
of the demand for Islamic debt.
DEBT FINANCING OF ISLAMIC BANKING
There are two main types of contracts that define financing 
operations of the Islamic banking system: the contract 
of PLS (ukud al-isytirak) and the contract of exchange 
(ukud al-mu’awadhat). Under the PLS contract banks 
provide al-mudarabah financing to its client for a share 
of profits (or losses), or al-musyarakah financing when 
the bank also becomes a partner in any venture or project. 
The contract of exchange requires a bank to use its funds 
to facilitate economic transactions, usually involving a 
purchase of goods or assets from a third party and resells 
them to its client on a deferred basis. The deferred contract 
of exchange enables Islamic banks to create various 
financing instruments that can be classify as debt-based. 
A breakdown of various types financing instruments 
of the Islamic banking system in Malaysia is shown in 
Table 1.
TABLE 1.  Islamic banking: Financing by concepts (RM million)
 Type of financing June 2009 Dec 2009 June 2012
 Al-musyarakah 1558.3 2349.4 9699.8
  (1.4) (1.8) (4.5)
 Al-mudarabah 442.9 375.7 250.3
  (0.4) (0.3) (0.1)
 Bai bithaman ajil 36866.5 42913.6 69593.1
  (32.4) (32.1) (32.4)
 Ijarah 3184.2 4033.0 3711.8
  (2.8) (3.0) (1.7)
 Ijarah thumma al-bai 35398.9 38953.3 52003.6
  (31.2) (25.2) (24.2)
 Al-murabahah 18857.0 23020.2 35379.4
  (16.6) (17.2) (16.5)
 Istisna 1468.0 1486.5 1265.2
  (1.3) (1.1) (0.6)
 Others 15831.8 20350.7 43081.7
  (15.9) (15.2) (20.0)
 Total 113607.6 133482.3 214984.9
  (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) 
  Notes: End of period
  Number in brackets are percentage of total
  Islamic banking = Islamic banks + Islamic banking Scheme
  Exclude financing sold to Cagamas
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It can be seen from Table 1 that the proportion of 
equity financing of al-mudarabah and al-musharakah 
is quite small, less than 5 percent, and it does not show 
any sign of increasing. On the other hand, bai bithaman 
ajil (BBA), ijarah thumma al-bai (ITB) and al-murabahah 
are by far the more important financing instruments of 
the Islamic banking system in Malaysia, collectively 
contributing more than 75 percent of the total financing. It 
should be noted that in practice, all these types of financing 
are done utilizing the principle of al-murabahah (mark-up 
or cost-plus). As such in many Middle Eastern countries, 
these financing products are all classified under the al-
murabahah financing system (Norazlina 2005). Thus, it 
is quite clear that, at least in Malaysia, debt financing, in 
particular the various types of al-murabahah financing 
was affected through the deferred contract of exchange are 
the more important features of the Islamic banking system. 
PLS financing is quantitatively too small and thus it cannot 
adequately represent the reality of Islamic banking.
MODEL
In this model, we modified a Classical-model to be 
consistent with the principles of Islam that prohibit 
interest rates. In terms of analysis, this study uses a 
micro foundation for macroeconomic analysis that links 
various sectors of an economy together. The agents in the 
economy consist of households, firms and the government. 
In order to be consistent with the principles of interest-
free financing, a few equations such as labor and good 
market equilibrium conditions, production function, 
utility function and capital accumulation equation from 
the standard classical-model will be modified.
Under the classical economy, wages and rental rate 
of capital are predetermined for firms. This implies that 
the claim on capital and labor must be satisfied before 
knowing the actual profits of the firms. In contrast, 
under the Islamic economy, only wage for labor is 
predetermined while the capital is only rewarded if firms 
yield an economic profit. Both the entrepreneur and 
external financier will decide their agreed profit sharing 
ratios before starting the business under the PLS system. 
This implies that when a firm tries to maximize its own 
profit share, it ends up maximizing the profit share of the 
financier as well. It is important to note that here, under 
an Islamic economy, the employment consists of labor 
hired by entrepreneurs in the market and labor hired from 
entrepreneurs’ personal labor force. Thus, we denote 
‘household’ as the financier and ‘firm’ as the entrepreneur 
throughout the model. In addition, we also introduce an 
Islamic debt-based financing instrument in which banks 
buy the commodity on behalf of the household and sell 
it to the household at an agreed margin of profit added 
to the cost. The payment is generally being deferred and 
paid together with the markup.
Consider an economy that is populated by a large 
number of identical and infinitely lived-in households. 
The number of households is and for simplicity we assume 
that the population is constant or the growth rate is zero 
(Lt + 1 = Lt). They all have the same preferences and choose 
the allocation portfolio between cash goods, mudarabah 
goods (goods purchased using PLS financing) and equity 
goods. It is assumed that both mudarabah and equities 
are perfect substitutes, as the household will refuse to 
hold a less attractive asset. Consequently, households 
are assumed to allocate their wealth between the three 
groups of financial assets, which are cash goods for 
transaction ( s m dt t tc  c  c), mudarabah goods (
s m d
t t tc  c  c) for investment 
and murabahah goods (goods purchased using various 
types of al-murabahah financing) (s m dt t tc  c  c ) for consumption. 
The preference is given by:
0 0
t s m d
t = t t tE U c  c  c  ∑ , ,• b  (1)
Since the rate of return on cash goods is zero, the 
real rate of return is negative by the rate of inflation. 
For mudarabah goods, the household as a financier 
of mudarabah will receive a markup denoted as μ% 
of the normal profit rate in the economy, θ. Thus, the 
total-markup is equal to ρ = μθ. We assume that both the 
household and the firm know this profit rate and they 
negotiate the profit-sharing ratios, (1 − ρ) : ρ respectively. 
Under the mudarabah system, capital is rewarded only if 
the firm produces wealth. Denoting θ as the Islamic profits 
in the economy, following Muhammad Anwar (1987), we 
assume that ‘Islamic profits’ here are equal to the total 
revenue minus the total cost. In contrast with the classical-
model, here the total costs do not include returns to capital 
and entrepreneurial labor, which is given by:
t t t tp Y w L
pK
-= ( )q
 
(2)
Assume that the firm (entrepreneur) of goods i for 
instance, produces goods i using a constant returns to scale 
Cobb-Douglass production function denoted by:
1( ) ( ) ( )t t tY i K i L i
-= a a  (3)
where Lit and Kit are labour and capital in a competitive 
market, respectively. Each household is endowed with one 
unit of labor, which is supplied exogenously and earning a 
wage rate, wt in period t. Households also holding capital 
and receive a rental rate of capital equal to ktp , which is 
also known as the user cost of capital. In the classical-
model, the real capital rate consists of a depreciation 
rate (δ), change in capital due to change in inflation (π) 
and the finance cost determined by a fixed interest rate 
(r). However, in the Islamic economy, an interest rate is 
prohibited. Thus, in order to determine the user cost of 
capital, we follow Anwar (1987) who views expected 
profit share of the financier, ρ = μθ as the capital cost. 
Therefore, instead of following ktp  = r + δ - π, where δ is 
the depreciation rate, now we assume that ktp  = ρ + δ - π 
since r is prohibited in the Islamic economy.
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Denote wt and (ρ + δ - π) as the wage and the rental 
rate of capital respectively, then the profit maximization 
of the firm is given by:
{ }
1( ) ( )t t t t it itK ,Li i p K i L i w L + K
α- - - -max ( )a r d p  (4) 
The first order condition with respect to Ki, Li give 
the following marginal productivity of capital and labor 
or so-called factor payments (in aggregate terms):
(1 )t t
t t
w K
p L
 = -  
 
a
a
 
(5)
and
1
t
t t
Lp    
p k
- + - =  
 
a
d p a
 
(6)
Due to symmetry, the cost minimization in the input 
market implies the optimal combination of labor and 
capital when the labor supply is exogenous which are 
given by:
( )
( ) 1
t t
t
K i w
L i p    
=
- + -
a
a d p  
(7) 
We assume that households consume not only normal 
goods (ct) but also consume murabahah goods (
s m d
t t tc  c  c ) by 
asking the bank to purchase an asset. This loan will be paid 
with a markup equal to κ. It is assumed that the markup 
is a predetermined variable resulting from the decisions 
undertaken in period t - 1. By decomposing consumption 
into normal and murabahah goods, we obtain:
Ct = ct + 
d
t c + 1 pt - (1- δ)
s m d
t t tc  c  c pt - φ(1 + κ)pt
s m d
t t tc  c  c  (8)
where φ is the percentage of the sequence of payments 
made by households to the bank at regular time 
intervals. 
Furthermore, consider the case of endogenous capital 
accumulation, where both the supply and demand for 
capital are determined endogenously. Denote that It is 
the household’s investment during period t and capital 
is depreciated at rate δ; the capital accumulation is 
therefore:
Kt + 1 = It + (1 - δ)Kt (9)
The market clearing condition is given by:
Yt ≡ Ct + It + G (10)
Denote Yt as the household’s demand for goods in 
period t, while wt, 
k
tp , Πt and Tt are real wage, real capital 
rate, and profit flow from firms and taxes, respectively. 
Thus, the flow of budget constraints that incorporate the 
holding of cash, mudarabah-equity goods explicitly take 
the form:
1 1
1 1
s m t
t t  t t  t
t t
s d
t t t t t t  t t  
w     
c p c p L
p p
K Y + c p c p
- -
+ +
 + -+ + +  
 
- - = +
r d pr
t + 1 + 1P  
(11)
By combining equations (9) and (10) and substituting 
these into (11), we now have the flow of budget constraints 
with endogenous capital accumulation as following:
1 1
1
(1 ) (1 )
(1 )
s m t
t t  t t  t
t t
d d d
t t t + t t t t t
s m
t + t t t t t + t t + t
w     
c p c p L
p p
K c c p c p p c
K K G T c p c p
- -
 + -+ + +  
 
- - + - + + -
+ - - + - = +
r d pr
d j k
d
 1
 1  1P    
(12)
In order to derive the demand model, let us assume 
that the specific utility function is given by:
{ } ( ), , , 1 , ,
, ,
1
s m d
t t ts m d c c c Kt t t t
s m d
t t t
 c c c
c c c
U
- 
 =
-
sg f a
s
 + 
1  
max
 
(13)
where 1=s  
q
 is the elasticity of substitution between the 
consumed quantities of the cash goods and debt θ goods. 
It measures the strength of the substitution effect that a 
change in relative prices induces. By using L’Hospital’s 
rule, this utility function converges to a logarithmic as 
σ → 1. According to this rule, differentiate both the 
numerator and denominator with respect to σ and then 
take the limit of the derivatives’ ratio as σ → 1, which will 
converge the utility function to γIn s m dt t tc  c  c+ φIn
s m d
t t tc  c  c+ αIn
s m d
t t tc c  c + λt.
The problem of a representative household is therefore 
to maximize (13) subject to (12) with respect T to s m dt t tc  c  c, 
s m d
t t tc  c  c, 
s m d
t t tc  c c  and Kt + 1. The Lagrangian is given by:
L  = γIn s m dt t tc  c  c+ φIns m dt t tc  c  c+ αIns m dt t tc c  c  + λt (14)
11
1
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
s m s m t
t + t t + t t t t t  t 
t
d d
t t t t t t
t
d
t t t + t t t t
w
c p c p c p c p L
p
    
K c c p c p
p
 p c K K G T
--
 + - - - 
 
  + -- + + - -  
  
 - + + - - + - + 
  
r
r d p d
j k d
 1  1  
+ 1 + 1
P
The first order necessary conditions for this Lagrangian 
with respect to s m dt t tc  c  c, 
s m d
t t tc c  c, 
s m d
t t tc  c c  and Kt + 1 are:
1
1
t s
t t  c p -
= gl
 
(15)
1
1
t m
t t  c p -
= fl
r  
(16)
( ) ( )1 1t dt tc p
=
- + +  
al
d j k  
(17)
1
(1 ) t
t t  
    
p +
+ - + - = lr d p d
bl  
(18)
Using (15) and (16), the demand for mudarabah 
goods is given as:
m
t
s
t
c
c
= f
gr  
(19)
 pt
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Notice that, the demand for mudarabah goods here 
is negatively related with ρ, instantaneous profit sharing 
associated with the household (financier). The higher 
the ratio of profit sharing, ρ, the lower the amount of 
mudarabah demanded by the firm (entrepreneur). In 
addition, the demand for mudarabah-equity goods is also 
subject to the elasticity of substitution between cash and 
mudarabah goods, which are φ and γ.
Next, by combining (15) and (17), we obtain the 
demand for murabahah that is specified as the following 
form:
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1
d
t
s
t
c
c
=
- + + +  
a
g d j k p  
(20)
From (13), it can be noted that the demand for Islamic 
debt-based financing negatively depends on the markup, 
κ. The reason is because the markup also reflects the 
cost of borrowing and thus, if the markup is higher, the 
amount of debt-based loans will be lower. The demand 
for murabahah is also determined by φ which is the rate 
of periodic payments made by the household to the bank 
at regular time intervals. Apart from that, the demand 
for murabahah is negatively related to inflation. The 
negative impact of inflation on debt implies that Islamic 
debt financing serves as an automatic stabilizer on credit 
and money supplies.
Using (15) and (18), the asset accumulation margin 
for cash goods is given by:
( )
1
1
s
t t 
s
t t  t
pc     
c p p-
+ -= + -b r d p d+ 1
 
(21)
Next, using (16) and (18), the following asset 
accumulation margin is obtained for murabahah goods:
( )1
d
t t 
d
t t t
pc     
c p p
+ -= + -b r d p d+ 1+ 1
 
(22)
Finally, using (15) and (18), the asset accumulation 
margin for mudarabah goods is given by:
( )
1
1
m
t t 
m
t t  t
pc     
c p p-
+ -= + -b r d p d+ 1
 
(23)
Finally, by combining (14) and (15), the non-arbitrage 
condition is obtained which is:
( )1
1
s m d
t t t 
s m d
t t t t
c c c     
c c c p
 + -= = = + - +  
b r d p d
p
+ 1 + 1 + 1
  
(24)
This condition suggests that the expected return on 
mudarabah, murabahah and cash goods are equal to the 
expected real rate of return on capital. 
CONCLUSION
Islamic financing techniques may have different effects 
on the decision-making of economic agents as well as on 
the macroeconomic framework of the economy. Although 
there have been a substantial amount of research studying 
Islamic financing, most of the existing literatures only 
focus on a profit loss sharing system which is based on 
mudarabah and musyarakah systems. The practice in 
reality however, is overwhelmingly dependent on the use 
of Islamic debt-based financing instruments while profit 
loss sharing is the least demanded mode of financing in 
most of the Islamic banks in the world. Unfortunately, no 
study so far has been made in the context of a theoretical-
macroeconomic framework to investigate the behavior of 
agents in economics towards Islamic debt-based financing 
or murabahah. Hence, this paper addresses the gap in the 
literature by analyzing the model for both mudarabah and 
murabahah. In this paper, we have analyzed the behavior 
of agents in economics through their consumption, 
production and investment. By means of an infinitely lived 
representative agent model, we have analyzed the demand 
for goods to be purchased by deferred payment. We found 
that the demand for murabahah is negatively related to the 
markup, inflation rate and the rate of periodic payments as 
well as the elasticity of substitution between goods. The 
negative impact of inflation on debt implies that Islamic 
debt financing serves as an automatic stabilizer on credit 
and money supplies.
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